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Accepted Revision for Critical Public Health, May 2012 
Title: ‘Risking enchantment’: how are we to view the smoking person? 
 
From East Coker, by T. S. Eliot 
There is, it seems to us, 
At best, only a limited value 
In the knowledge derived from experience. 
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
For the pattern is new in every moment 
And every moment is a new and shocking 
Valuation of all we have been. (Eliot 1974) 
 
Introduction 
A recent thematic issue of this journal offers a critique of public health policy in relation 
to drinking, smoking and obesity (Bell et al. 2011), discussing the ways in which current 
biomedical culture characterises the body as the passive victim of these ‘epidemics’ and 
‘addictions’.  Other articles raise awareness of the extent to which medical culture 
dominates public health discourse in relation to smoking.  Such approaches lead us 
outside the narrow context of health concerns into an analysis of why it is that tobacco 
smoking remains such a pervasive habit despite the many health problems it has been 
proved to cause.  Dennis (2011) uses ideas from Merleau-Ponty to draw attention to the 
embodied experience of smoking.  She explores the idea of an unbounded human body 
extended into the space surrounding it, affecting and being affected by that space in a 
way that the bounded, compartmentalised biomedical body is not.  Bunton and Coveney 
(2011) remind us that human beings are motivated by pleasure and categorise some of the 
ways in which the pleasure principle might apply in respect of ‘drugs’ like tobacco.  
Mair’s focus (2011) is on the ‘behavioural turn’ in public health, noting that this 
approach separates the person from the behaviour, leading to a potentially distorting 
tendency to study, count and treat instances of the behaviour rather than the person who 
smokes. 
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What unites these approaches is an attempt to broaden how public health understands the 
human subject.  Images and understandings of human beings in public health are not 
casual or inert.  First of all, they have specific, intentional, directional  histories, or 
‘archaeologies’ and ‘genealogies’ in Foucauldian  terms.  Thus present ideas about 
persons in public health could be traced to the emergence of biopower in the 19
th
 century 
(Foucault 1978); that is, to a momentous concentration of technologies of power around 
life (Rabinow and Rose 2006) and its ‘management’.  Secondly, public health’s images 
and ideas of the person have effects.  On the one hand, classifications can affect the very 
people they classify (Hacking 2004), and can serve to reify negative moral judgements 
towards them (Mair 2011).  On the other hand, understanding human beings in certain 
ways for the purpose of research or intervention can serve to reify hegemonic or 
authoritative discourses and thus legitimate those very understandings of people and their 
loci as objects for further research and intervention (Eakin et al 1996; Mair and Kierans 
2007). 
 
Although ideas and concepts of the person in public health can thus be considered not 
entirely innocent, they are nevertheless well meant.  Public health, as other health 
agencies and institutions, has ‘life, not death, as their telos’ (Rabinow and Rose 2006, p. 
203).  Yet public health is embedded within the main mechanisms of biopower: a 
tendency to create and consolidate truth discourses and their authoritative figures; a 
commitment to intervention; the use of technologies for attaining specific forms of 
subjectification (Rabinow and Rose 2006).  This embeddedness makes it almost 
impossible for the discipline to escape its own particular gaze and modes of knowledge, 
and thus its own constituted ideas of what persons are, how they operate and how they 
can be ‘changed’.  If we accept in ethical terms public health’s right to intervene in 
people’s lives with the object of enhancing health or extending life, we might 
nevertheless object that these interventions are based on an ill-informed – or at least 
partially informed - set of ideas about the human being. 
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Focussing on research and and interventions in the field of tobacco control, the aim of 
this paper is to outline what views of the ‘smoking person’ are assumed by these 
activities, and to argue for an expanded perspective that draws upon a wider range of 
sources through which to understand the experience of smoking.  We argue that other 
fields of knowledge, both in the social sciences and the humanities, provide alternative 
and critical views which could help public health move towards a more humanistic, 
nuanced view of the person.  In particular, we propose that what may be missing in public 
health’s conceptualisations of people is the ‘existential’ evidence provided by the literary 
and creative arts.  We suggest that an acceptance on the part of tobacco control 
researchers and practitioners of what might be regarded as ‘soft-touch’ forms of 
knowledge (as in ethnographic, phenomenological, or narrative approaches) could result 
in a more empathetic and compassionate understanding of persons in all their fluidity, 
contradiction and humanity.  An incursion into hitherto unexplored theoretical and 
pragmatic fields in the social sciences and humanities could lead to entirely different 
understandings of what is to be human, and the position of this entity within a web of 
social, political and economic complexity that demands a critical reassessment of the foci 
of research and intervention efforts (Mair 2011; Kohrman and Benson 2011).  
 
Views of the human in smoking-related research and practice 
There are many reasons why smoking still has a prevalence of around 21% in both the 
UK and the USA (ONS 2011; CDC 2010).  Some are intimately tied up with the fact that 
humans are complex beings whose ideas about what makes them who they are and able 
to live well may not necessarily be related to what makes their bodies healthy.  This 
complexity is not, however, reflected in the ways that public health researchers 
investigate smoking.   
 
Much smoking research has been carried out in the context of clinical medicine or public 
health and is preoccupied with getting people to stop.  In an article published in this 
journal in 2007, Mair and Kierans argue that the concatenation of much tobacco research 
with tobacco control is problematic. These authors point out that in a context in which 
tobacco research is goal-oriented and directed at cessation, and where tobacco is seen as 
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an ‘epidemiologiocal phenomenon’ (2007, p. 106), smoking tends to be defined as a 
‘disease’, ‘disorder’ or ‘deficits in the individual or among groups of individuals’ (2007, 
p. 107).  This epidemiological interpretation of smoking turns the epidemic into the 
agent, and the people who smoke into mere vessels for its expression.  
 
Even when tobacco control scholars or practitioners try to expand the scope of their 
investigations to include contextual information they can fall into epistemological and 
methodological traps. Research in clinical practice settings can be particularly revealing 
in this regard.  Copeland (2003) explored smoking amongst disadvantaged women 
aiming to ‘identify what role smoking has in the lives of the study group’.  The methods, 
however, consisted of getting women to fill in the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
(HAD) Scale, a knowledge of health risks measure, a measure of opinions on the 
effectiveness of smoking cessation practices, and an open-ended questionnaire on 
smoking.  It would be difficult, given the anti-smoking steer from the chosen methods, to 
elicit responses other than ‘guilt’ about not giving up smoking.  There was also little 
scope to explore what it might be about smoking that is identity-making, relational, 
contextual, or even positive or enjoyable.   
 
The principles that guide this type of research, as well as the epistemological assumptions 
and the choice of methods, determine the particular visions of smoking individuals which 
result from such studies.  On the other hand, and in a circular fashion, pre-existing and 
reified ideas about the smoking person continue to inform the specific epistemological 
and methodological choices in subsequent tobacco research, thus legitimizing both object 
and forms of investigation. This vicious circle not only limits public health and tobacco 
control´s potential for conducting effective anti-tobacco work, rooted in a real 
understanding of the wider realities, but also has the capacity to stigmatise and 
marginalise specific classes of persons or sub-groups by attributing certain ‘smoking’ 
characteristics to them and by repeatedly picking them as targets for anti-smoking 
interventions (Mair 2011).  As Hacking (2004) notes, classifications affect people, not so 
much because of people´s knowledge of such categorisations, but because of the way in 
which classifications guide the purpose and actions of relevant institutions. 
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But what are those classifications, those ideas and concepts that both inform and result 
from tobacco control research and practice?  We will briefly present some of the general 
visions of the smoker which can be found in public health and clinical contexts, although 
we will not develop their origins or the exact consequences of their application, which 
fall outside the scope of this article.  
 
The smoker as agent 
Pilnick and Coleman (2003) provide rich evidence of GPs’ desperate attempts to engage 
reluctant quitters in conversation about their smoking.  The frustration generated when 
contradictory world views collide is plain to see in their accounts.  For the patient, 
smoking is so significant, so much a part of their being, that addressing the addiction or 
the health consequences alone is not enough to help them stop.  For the doctor, this is 
inexplicable: if smoking is ruining their health, why do they persist in their habit?  Why 
do they not make a rational, informed decision to quit? 
 
What this example from a clinical context offers is a widespread medical and public 
health view of smokers as rational agents who need only to be presented with the facts to 
respond appropriately.  This approach to smoking in public health has a history dating 
back to the UK Royal College of Physicians’ 1962 report on smoking1.  It is clearly in 
evidence in a short populist book published as a Penguin paperback by the architect of 
the report, Charles Fletcher, which was intended to give clear information to the public 
about the dangers of smoking (Fletcher 1963).  Similar assumptions about public 
rationality underpin a campaign in New Zealand encouraging health professionals to 
‘Ask About the Elephant’ - the elephant in the room being the ignored or unaddressed 
problem of smoking (New Zealand Government, 2011).  More visceral emotions are 
invoked by an Australian anti-smoking campaign with its graphic pictorial health 
warnings and television adverts featuring blackened lungs on mortuary slabs, failing 
hearts and patients with horrific mouth cancer (Brennan et al. 2011). A similar approach 
                                            
1 This report, according to Berridge (2007, p. 16) ‘was the harbinger of a new media-based role for 
medicine’ in which science, including epidemiology, was put to work explaining the dangers of smoking to 
a receptive public.   
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has been taken by TV adverts in the UK showing the slow deterioration of a woman with 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) through the eyes of her son (Fresh Smoke 
Free North East 2011).  Yet tobacco control studies reveal that shocking, fear-inducing 
campaigns designed to ‘scare people straight’ (Thompson, Barrett and Pearce 2009) do 
not necessarily have the desired effect (Davis et al 2007; Heikkinen et al 2010; Cook and 
Bellis 2001; Gilbert 2005).  Thompson, Barnett and Pearce (2009) suggest that for people 
with low levels of ‘efficacy’, such campaigns may generate defensiveness, avoidance or 
active opposition. 
 
Dennis (2011) explores smokers’ creative resistance to a undirectional future in which 
their blackened lungs end up on a mortuary table, as portrayed in an antismoking 
advertisement.  Such resistance may be to the closing down of potentiality of the future 
body that such advertisements connote, or to the rupture with their embodied self and 
habited past that abandoning smoking will require.  For other smokers, resistance may 
signify contrariness or rebelliousness: an intention to court risk and cause damage to 
themselves and others, possibly even rejoicing in the failure of public health and tobacco 
control programmes to bring them into the fold and rescue them from their own 
potentially fatal behaviour.  We glimpse this characterisation in Dennis’ interviews with 
smokers on their response to anti-smoking advertising (Dennis, 2006): ‘The ads have the 
reverse effect on me; it reminds me that it’s probably time for one.’  Thompson et al. 
(2009) also identify this response in their quote from a lapsed ex-smoker having a sly 
smoke on a night out: ‘There must be an element of wanting to belong to that crowd … 
those health-conscious nut cases are behind me... It’s like regaining youth and Bourbon 
drinking.’  
 
Public health’s and tobacco control’s vision of the smoker as an agent - either rational or 
perverse - does not necessarily yield positive results in interventions, and fails to address 
what motivates people to start and continue smoking in the face of so much anti-tobacco 
information.  Nor do smokers and smoking exist in a vacuum.  Instead, being a certain 
kind of smoker is itself something which is only possible or meaningful under certain 
social, cultural, economic and historical conditions.  These include, but are not restricted 
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to, the activities of governments, global stock market flows, patterns of socio-economic 
development and inequality, the tobacco industry, tobacco control, etc, and the manner in 
which these elements interact. 
 
The smoker as non-agent 
The concept of ‘nudging’ in public health draws on a different model of the person.  
Nudging involves manipulating the environment to provide - or remove - stimuli in order 
to prompt people to behave in healthier ways.  Examples might include the removal of 
‘tobacco walls’ from retail outlets or legislative changes such as the ban on smoking in 
indoor public places.  The evidence suggests that such practices can be effective 
(Hargeaves et al. 2010, Marteau et al. 2011) but the model of human nature on which 
they are based is different to that of the rational, agentive human being who can be 
persuaded by appeals to the intellect or the emotions.  This schema imagines smoking 
persons as devoid of agency.  Rather the smoking person becomes a Pavlovian 
automaton, a view supported by some psychopharmacological research on dependency 
(Hogarth 2011).  In this framework, smokers’ behaviour is fuelled by their inherent 
impulsivity and need for instant gratification.  
 
The idea of the smoker as addict fits this conception.  The rhetoric here states that 
addictive substances contained in tobacco imbue the desire to smoke and compel the 
action of smoking, with the smoker following an impulse which is ordered from within 
her own body but by an agency other than her own.  In a curious twist of paradigmatic 
frames, tobacco (or, more accurately, the addictive substances in tobacco, such as 
nicotine) function as an agent or actant in a Latourian sense (Latour 2005, p. 107).  The 
tobacco control fight here is against the addictive substance, a battle that takes place 
within the body of the smoker but, again, mostly without her conscious awareness: the 
idea is, as before, to expel the material actant from within and thereafter keep it firmly 
excluded from the non-agentive body.  In this vision the smoker is seen as a victim of 
either internal or external forces which, as the material and immaterial causes of the 
smoking misbehaviour, are the real agents. 
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Once again this model of the smoking person fails to account for and explain a large 
proportion of real smoking practices, such as social or secret smoking (Thomson, Pearce 
and Barnett 2009) or cycles of quitting and re-starting.  And, as before, there are political 
and economic consequences deriving from considering smoking persons as non-agents: 
tobacco consumption can then be comfortably fitted within the epidemic model for both 
research and practice purposes, and certain forms of public health interventions are 
reinforced and reified, even if their effectiveness is limited (Mair and Kierans 2007).  
  
The myth of the stable ‘core’ person 
Underlying these conceptions of the person in smoking cessation research and practice, 
that of the agentive, rational decision-maker and or the non-agentive automaton at the 
mercy of external forces beyond her control, is a model of a unitary being constituted by 
a stable core and a movable periphery.  What the interventions aim to address are less the 
person but their problem behaviour: an appendage of the stable core person (Mair 2011).  
Research articles abound with beings who are variously classified as men, women, 
young, old, middle class, manual workers, imprisoned, mentally ill, white or from an 
ethnic minority.  All these beings possess, extraneous to their ‘core’, immaterial and 
mutable appendages in the form of values, ways of thinking and, most importantly, 
behaviour.  These epiphenomena are regarded as separate and separable from the being of 
a person, things that can and, in some cases, should be changed.  They are attributes put 
there in the first place, somehow artificially, by others in the form of social norms, peer 
pressure, or media messages.  Or else, and sometimes simultaneously, they result from an 
inner taint or weakness – impulsivity, psychiatric problems, addictions or even a deviant 
nature.  What follows is a logic of addition and subtraction: something added can also be 
taken away.  Since it is not intrinsically of the person, it can be removed.  The individual 
remains, but with the undesirable attribute discarded.    
 
Critical tobacco-related research 
All  models of the smoking person discussed above provide the rationale for different 
kinds of anti-smoking campaigns, but all have come in for criticism from social sciences 
and humanities scholars who conceive of human beings differently.  Their work 
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challenges the notion of individuals as static, stable entities, either in control or subject to 
their behaviours, but always, potentially, able to expunge them without compromising 
their essential selves.  They make it evident that alternative types of research - away from 
the tobacco control model - are necessary if we are to understand not only the way in 
which persons are constituted and what makes them tick, but also what it is in the 
experience of smoking that makes it so attractive, meaningful and persistent, and what 
wider interpersonal, relational, social and cultural significances are brought about by the 
act of smoking. 
 
In some ethnographic work, for example, people describe cigarettes as being like friends 
or companions accompanying them through life in the absence of less reliable (human) 
friends.  In a study carried out in Rio de Janeiro one woman described the cigarette as: 
 
.. the best and worst friend you can have. .. he is the best because he is with you 
when you are sad, when you’re happy, when you have insomnia [ … ] It is worse 
because it kills you, but it causes great pleasure.  (Trotta Borges and Simoes-
Barboas 2008). 
 
Hargreaves et al., (2010) found similar language in their study of the effects of the 
legislation on smoking in public places in England, noting how some smokers describe 
their relationships with cigarettes: ‘So everytime you get stressed […] I’ll have a 
cigarette.  It’s always a way out, so I see that as like a partner..’.  Hilary Graham’s 
pioneering work in this field has traced the importance of smoking in the lives of women 
in stressful situations such as caring for children in low income families.  Smoking is ‘an 
excuse to stop for 5 minutes’, in the words of one mother, ‘a moment of self caring 
which, unlike a cup of tea of coffee, needed no preparation’ (Graham 1987). 
 
Thompson, Pearce and Barnett (2009) studied smokers in New Zealand and uncovered 
subtleties of identity which take us much further than the traditional distinction between 
‘smoker’ and ‘non-smoker’ describing how individuals can shift in and out of such 
identities.  One ‘ex-smoker’ (‘Diane’) describes how having given up she temporarily 
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returned to it while drunk.  Having bought some cigarettes from a woman in a restaurant, 
she states: ‘I was conscious of the fact that I could show her I could really smoke so I was 
full draw-back, coming out of my nose, the whole thing’.  This description of the act of 
smoking gives some sense of its embodied pleasure, a theme also picked up by Dennis’ 
respondents (2011).  ‘Megan’ extends the sensuality of smoking for herself into flirtation, 
‘If I’m interested [in a man] I like to blow my smoke up around the side of his face, like a 
caress’.  
 
There are recurring themes throughout this empirical work on the lives people who 
smoke: cigarettes help women ‘cope’ under stress, provide time out and space in difficult 
lives, supply companionship when none is available; are a source of enjoyment, of 
sensual pleasure; they constitute identities – coolness, glamour (Willms 1991), being one 
with the crowd; but they also precipitate guilt about failing to stop, disgust at the 
smelliness of the habit and its unhealthiness.  These researchers all note the paradox for 
smokers: that smoking ‘works to promote … well-being while threatening their physical 
health’ (Graham 1987).  The smoking person here is the result of a complex interplay of 
relationships - with others and with cigarettes - involving sensation, emotion, and rational 
decision-making that combine in different configurations at different times and result in 
smoking or non-smoking acts.   
 
Social science thus critiques the narrow view that public health has taken of the smoking 
person and investigates the meanings that smoking has for individuals, the embodied 
experience, and the way in which it helps to constitute the many shifts in identity that 
people inhabit.  This work critiques the construction of smoking subjects and behaviours 
which then provide the rationale and justification for public health and tobacco control 
actions.  Following Mair and Kieran’s call for a diversification of tobacco-related 
research (2007), however, we would like to suggest the inclusion of other sources of 
knowledge about people who smoke and about the worlds they make and inhabit in the 
company of tobacco. We propose that humanities have much to offer a more empathetic, 
open-ended understanding of smoking persons, one which is also free from moral 
judgements and from the political and economic imperatives of tobacco control. 
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Understanding the smoking person: what other views may help?  
The humanities are, like the social sciences, interested in representing meaning, but, 
particularly in the form of the literary and creative arts, they have the advantage of being 
able to give voice to aspects of existence that might otherwise be inexpressible.  For 
example, in the exchanges between GPs and patients recorded by Pilnick and Coleman 
(2003), smokers often appear to struggle to put into words what smoking means for them.  
As we have seen, a theme that keeps cropping up throughout the studies discussed above 
is the idea of ‘coping’.  ‘Coping’ may have become a kind of shorthand for the complex 
interdependence between human beings and cigarettes which is played out in some of the 
other themes we discussed.  It hides feelings and relationships that may be inexpressible 
because most of us – those who smoke and those who research them – lack the language 
and reflexivity necessary to give these relations and feelings a coherent voice.  In clinical 
settings respondents are very familiar with framing narratives for presenting the stories of 
their illness or health behaviour (Montgomery Hunter, p. 128).  Likewise, in a research 
context, responses may be put into a familiar or expected language which only 
approximates to the way things are for the person concerned.  Other ways of expressing 
the meaning of smoking for individuals, such as through the language of pleasure or 
aesthetics, may thus be stifled in clinical or health research contexts because of such 
expectations and, as Bunton and Coveney point out (2011), because the aesthetic pleasure 
of smoking is unacknowledged, poorly understood or derided.   
 
If we were to frame the experience of smoking more widely within an embodied 
existence that that recognises the boundary between our bodies and the outside world 
(Radcliffe 2008), we might come to a deeper understanding of the idea of smoking as 
‘coping’.  The lungs represent a space within the body that is bounded but nevertheless 
connected to the outside world by the spontaneous activity of breathing (Katz 1999).  
Drawing in smoke and then exhaling it makes that connection between inside and outside 
visible.  For those for whom the world is a difficult place, smoking can convey some 
symbolic control over the connection between the body and the world.  Smoking can 
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contain and stifle that connection, allowing the person struggling with external pressures 
to attain at least vicarious protection from the hostile space of the world.
2
  
 
This level of understanding can be accessed via the kind of ethnographic work described 
in the preceding section (Dennis 2011).  Such empirical work pays attention to the 
symbolic meaning of smoking, how it delineates boundaries between the body and the 
external world; and how it emphasises the importance of relationships with things and 
context.  These themes are also clearly evident in the work of literary writers of fiction 
and non-fiction.  In these works experience can be more broadly framed within a 
lifeworld that is not confined to questions about smoking, and insights may be accessed 
from both internal and external perspectives.  In this context, the existential can be voiced 
alongside the practical in the lives of characters portrayed. 
 
The way smoking draws attention to the relationship between the spaces of the body and 
external space is well represented in the English playwright Simon Gray’s series of 
literary diaries about his life and writing.  In The Smoking Diaries (Gray 2008a) he 
describes his memories of starting smoking: 
 
..our smoking was exhilaratingly furtive, the deep, dark, swirling pleasures of the 
smoke being sucked into fresh, pink, welcoming lungs, it took me just three or 
four cigarettes to acquire the habit and you know there are still moments now 
when I catch more than a memory of the first suckings-in, the slow leakings-out 
when the smoke seems to fill the nostril with far more than the experience of 
itself, and I regret the hundreds or thousands of cigarettes that I never 
experienced, inhaled and exhaled without noticing… (p. 58).   
 
Unlike the case of the ‘coping’ smoker, who may see smoking as confining experience, 
Gray here revels in the widening of experience inherence in the act of smoking.  The 
quote from the lapsed quitter (‘Diane’) above (Thompson, Pearce and Barrett 2009) gives 
                                            
2
 This interpretation has been verified anecdotally by an lapsed ex-smoker who resumed the habit during a 
relationship breakdown. 
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voice to similar ecstasies, but in the hands of the writer, this account takes us further.  
Gray is revelling in the feeling of smoke in the body’s internal space - ‘far more than the 
experience of itself’- and he draws attention to the physical sensual pleasure of the act of 
smoking and also to the way in which smoking enhances the embodied experience of 
inhalation and exhalation, normally carried out without conscious awareness.  
 
Gray’s experience – and failure to quit throughout his life - parallels that of the fictional 
Zeno Costini in Zeno’s Conscience (Svevo 2002).  Zeno’s account of first starting to 
smoke is similarly furtive and intense.  Having stolen some of his father’s cigars he 
carries them off to smoke in secret: 
 
At the very moment I grabbed them I was overcome with a shudder of revulsion, 
knowing how sick they would make me.  Then I smoked them until my brow was 
drenched in cold sweat and my stomach was in knots (p. 8). 
 
Attempts to give up are fruitless.  As a result of a fever and sore throat his doctor advises  
‘…absolute abstention from smoking.  I remember that word, absolute!  It wounded me, 
and my fever coloured it.  A great void, and nothing to help me resist the enormous 
pressure immediately around a void’ (p. 10).  In an attempt to comply he allows himself 
‘one last cigarette’ (a recurrent theme in the novel): ‘I lit a cigarette and felt immediately 
released from the uneasiness’ (p. 10). 
 
Pattison and Heath (2009) note this same pattern in the life of Simon Gray who devotes 
one volume of his diaries to ‘the last cigarette’ (Gray 2008b).  He does not achieve 
abstinence, but manages to cut down.  For Gray ‘smoking is an integral part of his 
identity’ (Pattison and Heath 2009).  His smoking is intimately associated with his 
embodied existence as a writer.  He recounts to his readers the process by which his diary 
is being produced: 
 
All of the above was written - is being written – onto a yellow pad by a Cross 
ballpoint pen (pleasantly heavy) held, in the classic handwriter’s grip, between the 
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thumb and the forefinger of my right hand […] in my left hand, held between the 
two middle fingers in the classic smoker’s grip, is a cigarette.  But of course I 
smoke with my right hand when it’s not busy with a pen. (Gray 2008a, p. 54). 
 
The works of creative artists are full of such accounts of smoking, allowing the non-
smoking reader a rich sense of the embodied pleasures of the habit.  ‘I love stroking this 
lovely tube of delight’, says the playwright Dennis Potter in his final interview before his 
death from pancreatic cancer (Bragg 2007).  His sensuous enjoyment is echoed in the 
following passage from the autobiography of Spanish filmmaker Luis Buñuel: ‘…I love 
to touch the pack in my pocket, open it, savor the feel of the cigarette between my 
fingers, the paper on my lips, the taste of tobacco on the tongue’ (Buñuel 1982, cited in 
Walton 2000, p. 181).  It is as if Buñuel is speaking of a lover, so intense is the quality of 
his feeling for the cigarette and the experience of smoking.   
 
As in the case of Gray’s description of his first cigarette, these accounts may enhance our 
insights into the kinds of relationships with cigarettes more obliquely conveyed in 
research interviews with smokers.  The notion of cigarette as ‘friend’ or ‘companion’ 
seems more intelligable if we are able to access the feelings from which these 
descriptions arise.  Richard Klein examines these feelings in his book, Cigarettes are 
Sublime (Klein 1993).  Despite the allure of the habit he describes, Klein managed to quit 
while writing it.  Klein summarises this allure: 
 
The moment of taking a cigarette allows one to open a parenthesis in the time of 
ordinary experience, a space and a time of heightened attention that give rise to a 
feeling of transcendence, evoked through the ritual of fire, smoke, cinder 
connecting hand, lungs, breath and mouth. (p. 16). 
 
What we are arguing here is that literary accounts, whether fictional or non-fictional, 
cover the same kind of ground as has more recently been opened up by qualitative 
researchers, and that these accounts contribute important additional insights into the 
experience of smokers.  Literary accounts can represent those aspects of the smoking 
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person that reflect life lived imaginatively, sensually, joyfully, motivated and influenced 
by tactile pleasures, beliefs (that may be irrational), enchantment and desire.  In these 
contexts, smoking and its meanings can be brought vividly to life in ways that are not 
readily accessible to the  sciences or social sciences.  Of course such accounts cannot 
function as ‘evidence’ in the same way as empirical work.  They cannot be read as 
representing experience in the way ethnography does.  On the other hand, they may 
allude to smoking as a signifier as well as something signified.  Smoking is often used in 
film, for example, as a signifier of the sexually available, vampish woman (Isenberg 
2004, p. 248) and at other times to denote the maverick outsider (Sigourney Weaver in 
Avatar).  This semiotic function only works, of course, if it resonates in the minds of the 
audience and the cultural signifiers ground smoking appropriately in time and space (a 
claim that is strained in the case of Avatar).  Care needs to be taken in interpreting 
smoking in these cultural contexts.   
 
What we are championing here is a different kind of knowledge to that derived 
empirically.  The novelist David Lodge, describes this knowledge as ‘complementary to 
scientific knowledge’.  He goes on: ‘The philosopher Nicholas Maxwell calls this kind of 
knowledge “personalistic”, and argues that it must be combined with scientific 
knowledge if we are to attain true “wisdom” ’ (Lodge 2002, p.16).  That knowledge, 
represented within the imagined world of the novel or in the heightened reality of literary 
biography, as Lodge suggests, opens the reader’s perception and experience to other 
modes of being by speaking directly to a consciousness unframed by distancing 
methodologies.  
 
The pragmatic need for ‘critical’ public health 
Bringing together these two modes of understanding can be revealing of the complexity 
with which human beings interact with the things, spaces and people of their world.  As 
Byron Good, relating these ideas explicity to medicine, asserts: 
 
The scientific world is only one of several worlds or “subuniverses” in which we 
live, worlds which include those of religious experience, of dreams and fantasies, 
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or music and arts, and of the “common sense” reality which is paramount in much 
of our lives.  These are not simply forms of individual experience, but diverse 
worlds, with distinctive objects, symbolic forms, social practices, and modes of 
experience (1990, p. 122). 
 
The philosopher William James addressed the challenge of different ways of thinking 
about human nature in his description of pragmatism (the philosophical tradition with 
which he is associated) as a mediating philosophy.  His point is that whereas our society 
is trained and expected to respond rationally to empirical and scientifically generated 
facts and information (James 1929, p. 15) – viz. Common Sense About Smoking - our 
actual lives and sense of being in the world are experienced differently.  The idea of 
having a relationship with a cigarette, or the apparently irrational switching, according to 
context, from non-smoking person to smoker makes sense in these pragmatic terms.  In 
his writings James does not dismiss medical materialism but he insists on the centrality of 
other sorts of experiences, such as the emotional and spiritual, which are essential to what 
it means to be human (James 1929, p. 13). 
 
Applying this to a particularly pressing problem in UK tobacco control, it seems clear, 
from a recent review of qualitative research examining smoking in pregnancy, that many 
women suffer from a sense of emotional distruption at this time in their lives (Graham et 
al. 2011).  Graham’s findings present a group of women dealing with a major change in 
their sense of being (pregnancy) having also to cope with guilt, confusion and stress 
because of pressures on them to quit smoking.  Many pregnant women report coercion 
from partners who do not feel the need to quit themselves, or struggle with the sense that 
it is their ‘only pleasure’ during this difficult time (Sims and Smith 1983).  Others are 
caught in a constant stressful carousel of being a smoker, attempting to become a non-
smoker and then relapsing back to smoking.  The result is a kind of ontonlogical strife, 
such as that described by Sartre when he attempted to quit:  
.. it seemed to me that in giving up smoking I was going to strip the film of its 
interest, the evening meal of its savor, the morning work of its fresh animation.  
Whatever unexpected happening was going to meet my eye, it seemed to me that 
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it was fundamentally impoverished from the moment that I could not welcome it 
while smoking.  To-be-capable-of-being-met-by-me-smoking: such was the 
concrete quality which had been spread over everything.  It seemed to me that I 
was going to snatch it away from everything and that in the midst of this universal 
impoverishment, life was not so worth living.  (Sartre 2003, p.617) 
 
Sociologists Bowker and Leigh Star refer to this sense of strife or impoverishment as 
‘torque’; in their words, ‘a twisting of timelines that pull at each other’ (Bowker and 
Leigh Star, p. 27) resulting in a sense of unease and of difficulty finding ones place in the 
world.  Leigh Star and Bowker developed this idea by examining the shift of being from 
the stable category of ‘ill’ to the category of ‘well’ in the context of the tuberculosis 
sanatorium in Thomas Mann’s novel, The Magic Mountain.  The shift may be ultimately 
desirable, but it is none the less difficult and involves a disruption of being.  The literary 
context from which the idea of torque derives is important.  It is only by exploring 
disease against this background that Bowker and Leigh Star are able to foreground the 
‘out of time’ experience of the sanatorium.  As Mann himself commented in the 
afterward to his novel: ‘the story practices a hermetical magic, a temporal distortion of 
perspective reminding one of certain abnormal and transcendental experiences in actual 
life’ (Mann quoted in Bowker and Leigh Star, p. 186). 
 
The literary examination and development of the idea of ‘torque’ enables us to make 
more sense of the unease and stress felt by women who feel forced to undergo a shift of 
being during pregnancy.  It also suggests the possibility of further empirical research that 
might compare the well-being and pregnancy outcomes of women who continue to 
smoke those few ‘essential’ cigarettes during pregnancy unencumbered by guilt and 
efforts to quit, against those women who constantly strive to achive non-smoker status.  
At the very least, accounts of attempts to quit – by the women smokers and by Sartre 
himself -  may be best understood against the background of literary sources in which the 
sense of ‘being’ as a smoker is given its fullest explication. 
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Here, then, is where literary accounts in tandem with the social sciences might lead to 
more effective approaches to tackling the problem of smoking.  If we accept that smoking 
is for many constitutive of personhood, identity and a source of pleasure, as well as fully 
embodied and part of how they function as physical beings in connection with the 
everyday things of the world, we might envisage more nuanced ways of supporting 
cessation for individuals, and encourage more humane, less stigmatising attitudes towards 
those who smoke.  More controversially, we might even accept that individual smokers 
might sometimes be better left alone, with attention focussed instead on tobacco 
companies and the fiscal policies of national governments.   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, while acknowledging advances made in social science research to elicit and 
understand the experience of smokers, we have explored what the humanities have to add 
to how we conceptualise that experience.  There is a need to develop a more expansive 
understanding of human beings located culturally, historically, socially, and existentially; 
and to provide a full range of accounts of these beings that link social sciences and 
humanities disciplines more closely.  In addition, for researchers in the field of critical 
public health, it is important not just to critique but to offer practical applications of our 
extended understanding.  In the parallel developing discipline of critical neuroscience, a 
similar point is made by Choudhury and Slaby (2012): 
Preserving and integrating the forms of expertise and the discourses about human 
nature and the human lifeworld that philosophy, anthropology, sociology, history, 
and other humanities disciplines provide, is necessary in the face of 
neuroscience’s expansion and unquestioned cultural and institutional capital.  This 
will ultimately benefit neuroscience itself as it may be productively aligned with – 
instead of opposed to – those more traditional canons of knowledge that still, and 
rightly we believe, form the foundations of our scientific, cultural, and political 
self-understanding. (p. 3). 
In this passage, ‘neuroscience’ can productively be replaced by ‘public health’.  As a 
community of researchers we need to use our understanding to work alongside public 
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health in developing approaches that better respect a more complete view of human 
nature.   
 
As T.S. Eliot’s poem, East Coker, suggests, there may be limitations to the ‘knowledge 
derived from [empirical] experience’, and benefits to be gained by entering the 
imaginative worlds invoked in literature (Eliot 1974). Without rejecting the legitimate 
accounts of biomedicine and the understanding generated by scientific and social 
scientific investigation, we can insist on the importance of integrating ‘evidence’ 
generated by non-scientific means - ‘risking enchantment’ by experiencing the existential 
in accounts of being a smoker.  Such accounts bring with them a sense of ‘whats–it’s-
like’-ness that can be further enhanced by an understanding of the historical and 
pragmatic importance of smoking in people’s lives.  We think that working alongside 
these different perspectives will allow new approaches to research in public health and in 
the humanities;  and that this integration has the potential to inspire new ways of 
supporting efforts in tobacco control. 
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